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134 
WHAT THE MCRI CAN TEACH WHITE 
LITIGANTS ABOUT WHITE DOMINANCE 
Adam Gitlin* † 
The ballots have barely been counted, but litigation to enjoin implemen-
tation of the now-codified Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (“MCRI”) or at 
least limit its effect on admissions practices in Michigan’s universities is 
already underway. One of the primary arguments against the MCRI—and 
the basis upon which some plaintiff professors assert standing—is that stu-
dents will suffer an impaired education if current admissions practices are 
discarded. Assuming that the MCRI survives these legal challenges, educa-
tors should be consoled somewhat to know the MCRI may still offer some 
pedagogy as compensation: litigation will likely be brought to enforce its 
provisions, and that litigation is likely to fail, but not without some whites 
still learning a bit about what race means in America today. 
I. The Litigants 
Since the passage of California’s Proposition 209 in 1996, which offi-
cially prohibited affirmative action in that state, white higher-education 
applicants have not filed suit against the University of California for dis-
crimination in admissions. This is thanks in part to the University canceling 
certain initiatives before even trying them out, but is still remarkable given 
that whispers abound that the University is in fact employing racial prefer-
ences in admissions decisions. For two reasons, white applicants to 
Michigan universities may be more inclined to take up the gauntlet of litiga-
tion should they be refused admission. The first reason is historical, the 
second theoretical.  
First, would-be litigants have the recent Gratz v. Bollinger success be-
hind them in Michigan. In California, momentum from the Supreme Court’s 
1978 decision in University of California Regents v. Bakke is limited be-
cause any galvanizing effect it may have had has dissipated by now. When 
Californians passed Proposition 209, California did not have that immediate 
history of a successful challenge to the use of racial preferences in admis-
sions. In Michigan, litigation to protect the rights of whites may seem not 
only more appropriate, but, because of its recent history, more winnable.  
The second reason stems from the nature of admissions processes itself. 
In a recently published paper, economists Roland Fryer and Glenn Loury 
model employment decisions made on individual match-ups of members of 
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a group that benefits from affirmative action against members of a group 
that does not. Affirmative action in this tournament setting requires greater 
effort from those for whom no affirmative action target is set, because they 
are competing for spots for which others have a handicap. Without affirma-
tive action, but with the goal of diversity still in place, the authors predict 
that applicants will overwhelmingly exert less effort. To wit, in the educa-
tional setting, white applicants won’t try as hard to be admitted in the 
absence of affirmative action.  
In MCRI Michigan, the range of responses of whites to group handicaps 
like that modeled by Fryer and Loury is expanded. If white applicants per-
ceive admissions officers to be cheating, then instead of working harder, as 
they might under a tournament scheme in which the rewards were deter-
mined based on explicitly authorized differential treatment, they will simply 
take to the courts. Yes, they must be prepared to lose, and for standing rea-
sons, will not be able to demand admission as relief, but the lionizing of 
Jennifer Gratz by the anti-affirmative action movement gives reason to be-
lieve that finding plaintiffs will not be too difficult. 
II. The Litigation 
Yet the cases themselves will be difficult to win for evidentiary, statisti-
cal, and institutional reasons. First, white litigants will likely have to meet 
an intent standard. Since Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court has gen-
erally required plaintiffs alleging race-based discrimination to show that the 
state actor acted with discriminatory intent. Article I, § 26 of the Michigan 
Constitution now mandates that public universities “shall not discriminate 
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the 
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin.” The language focuses 
on the universities as actors, and never explicitly mentions a prohibition on 
disparate “impact” or “effect,” unlike civil rights laws offering relief for dis-
parate impact. Moreover, although Michigan civil rights law does allow for 
disparate impact claims with no proof of discriminatory intent, such claims 
are rarely successful, and only when some facially neutral policy that is used 
to classify all members of one group as deserving of different treatment 
(like a pregnancy disability-leave policy), a claim that here would confront a 
daunting bar. It is therefore more useful for analytical purposes to assume 
courts will apply an intent standard if universities are accused of derogating 
their responsibilities under the codified MCRI.  
Discriminatory intent is harder to show now, because state and private 
actors are more likely to be aware of the law, and are thus unlikely to leave 
smoking guns lying around; cases in which evidence of discrimination is 
unambiguous (“We don’t take your kind”) rarely offer comforting prece-
dent, because they tend to settle as soon as the carelessly misplaced firearm 
is identified. Accusations that an admissions decision was based on race 
invite attribution of that decision to holistic analysis, or other assessments 
that may be harder to quantify or disagree with (like essay quality).  
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Harder still will be to show discrimination when determinative factors 
used are difficult to parse from race. State universities will not be blind to 
signals of race, like membership in a student organization dedicated to ap-
preciating the heritage of a particular race. Admissions officers on the 
witness stand will then be able to point to any factor other than race and 
attribute the admissions decision to the marginal effect of that non-race fac-
tor, and do so credibly.  
But these officers may not have to be so evasive. Diversity is still a le-
gitimate objective—indeed, a “compelling state interest”—incapable of 
being maintained in universities solely in reliance upon economic progress, 
according to recent projections based on income gaps between black and 
white families, yet still necessary for one reason or another. For example, 
the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) revised equal-opportunity and di-
versity standard effectively makes the pursuit of diversity a requirement for 
law school accreditation. Without being permitted to use racial preferences, 
some admissions officers will have to find alternative ways of meeting that 
imperative. If they subsequently lend more weight to applications from stu-
dents who are members of organizations whose raison d’être is the 
appreciation of certain under-represented racial minorities, isolating race 
itself as the deciding factor will be difficult for those alleging race-based 
admission. Reliance on organization membership must be permissible, as-
suming the organization does not itself limit membership on the basis of 
race. This reliance must be allowed even where the members of the student 
organization at issue are overwhelmingly of the racial minority upon whose 
heritage the organization is founded. For an organization like the University 
of Michigan Law School, if nothing else, any court analyzing such an ad-
missions policy under a disparate treatment standard will have to contend 
with the argument that ABA accreditation is a “business necessity” that may 
justify the policy. 
White litigants will also face an uphill statistical battle, because they 
will initiate litigation at a time when debates are raging about the validity of 
using traditional regression techniques to assess causality; the friction in this 
field is highlighted quite lucidly in a series of pieces by Professors Richard 
Sander and Daniel Ho on the question of whether going to higher-tier law 
schools causes black students to pass the bar exam at lower rates. These ar-
guments have the potential to spill over into litigation, making causation 
even harder to prove statistically. 
Institutionally, white litigants will engage a system in which the status 
quo is that diversity reigns. Because the default in public (as well as most 
private) institutions of higher learning is a diversity-dominated approach to 
admissions, diversity appears to be the “natural” state of things, as if un-
engineered by the state. In the education setting, diversity is the general 
rule—it starts with outreach programs in the early years of education, and 
continues in various forms of scholarships, academic concentrations, post-
graduate fellowships, and private-sector recruiting. Even many opponents of 
racial preferences agree that exposure to the thoughts, attitudes, and experi-
ences of those coming from different walks of life ought to be part and 
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parcel of formal education, certainly at the collegiate level. Those attempt-
ing to enforce the MCRI will therefore be challenging not only the discrete 
decisions of university officials, but also a practice approaching a societal 
norm that is accepted without justification by many of its adherents.  
In employment discrimination cases, litigants who are members of an al-
legedly excluded racial minority face a similar institutional hurdle. Their 
proof requirement, though not explicitly stated as such, is to show why it is 
unnatural that only whites occupy certain positions at a given firm. That 
showing is tough to make, because in a labor market permeated by white 
dominance, where whiteness leads to certain jobs and being well compen-
sated for them, it is difficult to discern what, specifically, about a particular 
business or industry is so generous to whites over nonwhites. Even if racial 
diversity in the education setting is more apparently the product of deliber-
ate action than white dominance is in the employment setting, the same is a 
function of time: diversity is a young concept, conceived in part to combat 
white dominance in education, whereas white dominance in the employment 
setting is older, better entrenched, and purposefully, if sometimes thinly, 
veiled.  
III. The Lesson 
Whites—especially those likely to have voted for the MCRI—are not 
likely to perceive the quotidian disparities in treatment that members of ra-
cial minorities suffer in the employment context daily, often before they 
even secure a position. Matched pairs testing, an empirical technique used in 
the social sciences to quantify the effect of one characteristic on a set of 
outcomes, other things being equal, has lately been used to illuminate some 
of these obstacles: It may be that an “African American sounding name” on 
a résumé results in a lower chance of a callback interview than a “White 
sounding name” would. It may be a self-identified black jobseeker with no 
criminal record has a lower chance of securing certain employment than a 
white candidate with comparable credentials and a felony conviction. These 
experiential differences are noticeable, and beyond cavil in the right circum-
stances.  
And just as, with roughly equal qualifications, Lakisha and Jamal will 
have a harder time getting certain jobs than Emily and Greg, they may still 
have an easier time getting into Michigan universities, because even though 
admissions officers will not be able to consider their race, they will still be 
able to guess what students with certain names can bring to classroom dis-
cussion. Admissions officers would not use those names as proxies allowing 
use of racial preferences, but rather to point out how non-race attributes at-
tractive in a candidate may be difficult to tease apart from race. Of the 
panoply of factors used to make admissions decisions, showing that race 
was the deciding factor, while contending it masqueraded behind a name, 
will thus be a formidable challenge. One wonders how willing a court would 
be to alter the admissions process and fashion injunctive relief against a uni-
versity that uses name etymology as an admissions criterion. 
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White litigants will encounter difficulty in trying to demonstrate that 
race itself was responsible for their failure to be admitted, solely or jointly 
(depending on how courts interpret the amendment’s prohibitions, and 
whether the latter construction saves the MCRI under Grutter v. Bollinger). 
Yet that difficulty may educate them on the frustration inherent in litigation 
within a system built upon perpetual exclusion of certain people in the name 
of a priority advanced by those who control that system. To be sure, some 
will only be embittered and dig in their heels, ready to take on the system 
like so many pioneers of workplace integration. But maybe in the process 
others will come to realize how unequal American society still is, and will 
begin to understand why proponents of consideration of race in admissions 
believe as they do.  
